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Cross-Testing, Nondiscrimination, and New
Comparability: A Rejoinder to Mr. Orszag
and Professor Stein
EDWARD A. ZELINSKYt

In their response' to my article2 in this symposium issue
of the Buffalo Law Review, Peter Orszag and Norman Stein
advance their analysis of cross-testing, new comparability
and the nondiscrimination norm. I write this brief rejoinder
both to clarify the areas of our disagreement and to
complete our dialogue.
As a matter of arithmetic, Mr. Orszag, Professor Stein
and I all agree on the effects of interest compounding when
qualified plan participants are of different ages:
contributions deemed discriminatory when measured as
contributions may become nondiscriminatory when
converted into projected benefits and tested as such.3
Moreover, Mr. Orszag and Professor Stein mount no attack
upon my statutory analysis of the proposed cross-testing
regulations, i.e., that there is no textual basis for the
regulations' double testing mandate under which both
as
qualify
must
contributions
and
benefits
nondiscriminatory in the new comparability context.
From these premises, I come to a benign perspective on
new comparability plans since such plans achieve
allocations of pension resources which emulate the

" Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, Room
519, 55 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10003, phone: 212-790-0277, fax:
212-790-0205, e-mail: Zelinsky@prodigy.net.
1. Peter Orszag & Norman Stein, Cross-Tested Defined ContributionPlans:
A Response to ProfessorZelinsky, 49 BuFF. L. REV. 629 (2001).
2. Edward A. Zelinsky, Is Cross-Testing a Mistake? Cash Balance Plans,
New Comparability Formulas, and the Incoherence of the Nondiscrimination
Norm, 49 BuFF. L. REV. 575 (2001).
3. Orszag & Stein, supra note 1, at 629-30, 642-43; Zelinsky, supra note 2, at
581-83.
4. Zelinsky, supra,note 2, at 608, 610.
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allocations attainable via defined benefit arrangements.5 I
also conclude that there is no statutory footing for the
proposed cross-testing regulations insofar as those
regulations transform the disjunctive mandate of the
statute (qualified plans 6 may not discriminate as to
"contributions or benefits") into a statutorily unauthorized
requirement that new comparability arrangements pass
muster both in terms of projected benefits and current
contributions.7 More generally, I judge the nondiscrimination norm incoherent since a given allocation of
pension resources may be classified as discriminatory even
though a substantively identical allocation, achieved
through a different form of qualified plan, may be deemed
nondiscriminatory.'
The Orszag-Stein critique of these conclusions rests on
three assertions. First, Mr. Orszag and Professor Stein
generally oppose the defined benefit plans maintained by
small employers.' This opposition logically extends to crosstested new comparability plans: if small employer defined
benefit arrangements are verboten, the new comparability
devices which replicate outcomes achieved through such
arrangements properly go as well.
Mr. Orszag and Professor Stein's opposition to small
employer defined benefit pensions reflects a second facet of
our disagreement. They believe that current qualified plan
law constitutes a tax expenditure; ° I do not. The premise
5. See id. at 595-97.
6. I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1994).
7. Zelinsky, supra note 2, at 608, 610.
8. Id. at 616-25.
9. Orszag & Stein, supra note 1, at 632 ("[Dlefined benefit plans, which
historically have been tested on a benefits rather than contribution basis,
[should] be limited to situations in which the firm is not using the plan
principally to direct benefits to older highly compensated employees.") (citation
omitted); id. at 653 ("In particular, small defined benefit plans are often
designed to provide benefits primarily for proprietary employees and riskshifting effectively does not occur. The regulatory costs associated with defined
benefit plans are thus largely wasted, and the inequitable resource allocation
(similar to that in a cross-tested defined contribution plan) is unjustified.")
(parentheses in original).
10. Id. at 648 ("Given the structure of the current U.S. tax code, it appears
difficult to argue that qualified pension plans do not result in tax
expenditures."); id. at 649 ("Since the tax preferences accorded to qualified
pension plans cause foregone revenue that could have been used for other public
purposes, regulation to ensure that the tax expenditure is meeting some policy
objective is justifiable."); id. at 670 ("We are among those people who subscribe
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that current law is a tax subsidy underpins the OrszagStein indictment of small employer defined benefit plans
and of the cross-tested defined contribution plans which
mimic them. Per that indictment, these plans constitute a
drain on the public fisc with no compensating gain in
retirement security for rank-and-file employees. In
contrast, since I perceive no tax expenditure in the Code's
current treatment of qualified plans, I view the retirement
plans of business owners and professionals, not as publiclyunderwritten tax shelters, but as acceptable devices for
retirement savings.
Finally, Mr. Orszag and Professor Stein dispute my
assertion that the issue raised by new comparability plans
is one of form rather than substance." From my vantage,
we should, via cross-testing, permit new comparability
arrangements since we condone economically equivalent
defined benefit plans and the form by which allocations of
pension resources occur should not matter. In contrast, Mr.
Orszag and Professor Stein maintain that, even if arguendo
the small employer defined benefit pension persists, new
comparability and the cross-testing on which it depends
should not be allowed.
One of these issues-whether or not current law
constitutes a tax expenditure-has been much debated 2
and need not detain us now. However, even if the
conventional wisdom is correct and current law is
characterized as a tax subsidy, it is a tax subsidy which the
Code now channels into defined benefit plans, including
those maintained by small employers. Consequently, as a
legal matter, the statutory baseline condones the outcomes
achievable by defined benefit methodologies. New
comparability plans, through cross-testing, simply allocate
to the opposite view, which Professor Zelinsky in an understatement labels
conventional wisdom: that the tax regime for qualified plans varies from the
normative features of an income tax and thus can be justified only as a tax
expenditure.").
11. Id. at 651 ("Professor Zelinsky's 'substance should control over form'
position incorrectly assumes that cross-tested defined contribution plans are
equivalent to defined benefit plans with the same allocation of pension
resources across the firm's workers in any particular year. The equivalency does
not hold more broadly, however, undermining the assertion that the substance
of the two plans is indeed the same."); id. at 657 ("We thus reject Professor
Zelinsky's argument that the substance of cross-tested defined contribution
plans is equivalent to that of defined benefit plans.").
12. See Zelinsky, supra note 2, at 595 nn.62-63.
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resources in the same way as defined benefit plans,
typically to the pronounced advantage of the older
principals of the firm sponsoring the plan.
The Orszag-Stein critique is thus fundamentally a
policy critique of current law and its authorization of the
small employer defined benefit plan. This confirms my
assertion that opposition to new comparability is, at its
core, opposition to small plans generally.
As a political matter, I understand why those who
would outlaw small employer defined benefit plans are
today forced to focus their opposition narrowly upon new
comparability arrangements: Congress will not impose
further burdens on defined benefit arrangements nor will it
hinder age-weighted plans, aptly denoted by Mr. Orszag
and Professor Stein as the "first generation" 4 of cross-tested
devices. Hence, new comparability is the only politically
feasible target today for those whose underlying agenda is
the abolition of most small employer defined benefit plans. 5
Whatever the political merits of a strategy targeting
current opposition upon cross-tested new comparability
plans, as a theoretical matter, such selective opposition is,
by definition, selective and thereby vulnerable to the
criticism that opposition to new comparability is
intellectually unpersuasive, given the existence of defined
benefit and age-weighted arrangements which achieve
comparable distributions of pension resources. To deflect
this criticism, Mr. Orszag and Professor Stein claim that
defined benefit-style allocations, if they are to be permitted,
should be limited to true defined benefit plans, a position I
explore in my article and reject as unconvincing.' Nothing
in the Orszag-Stein analysis requires reconsideration of
that rejection.
Mr. Orszag and Professor Stein correctly note that
defined benefit arrangements may play a particularly
useful role in retirement planning since, by providing
employer-guaranteed benefits, such arrangements shift risk
to employers, rather than employees. Such risk-shifting,
they observe, is usually more formal than substantive in

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 610-11.
Orszag & Stein, supra note 1, at 643-44.
Zelinsky, supranote 2, at 610-11.
Id. at 612-16.
Orszag & Stein, supra note 1, at 650-57.
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the case of a small defined benefit plan given the identity of
economic interest among the owner of the firm, the firm
itself, and the plan which heavily benefits the owner in his
role as employee. Since in substance little real risk-shifting
occurs in the small plan context (the firm and the
owner/employee sharing the same economic interests), Mr.
Orszag and Professor Stein conclude that the tax
expenditure for defined benefit plans in this case is a bad
bargain since the public subsidy of this plan purchases no
significant risk-shifting for rank-and-file employees. 8
As an argument against small defined benefit plans,
this brings us back to the disputed premise that current law
constitutes a tax expenditure. However, this argument,
even if valid, does not explain why, if small defined benefit
plans are permitted under current law, the allocation of
pension resources they achieve should not also be allowed
via cross-tested defined contribution plans. There is de facto
no significant risk-shifting with either the typical small
employer defined benefit plan or an equivalent new
comparability plan. If, under current law, the former is
permitted, why not the latter?
The best explanation advanced by Mr. Orszag and
Professor Stein for their focus on new comparability is
tactical in nature; they would attack new comparability as a
"first step" in a long-term campaign against cross-testing
more generally and, ultimately, against most small defined
benefit plans. 9 But such tactics, whatever their political
18. In a related vein, Mr. Orszag and Professor Stein argue that other
features of the pension law erode the asserted equivalence between defined
benefit and new comparability plans. For example, they point out, the
limitations of I.R.C. § 415 might, in some cases, impact differently upon the two
types of plans. See Orszag & Stein, supranote 1, at 657-59. Or, to take another
example, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) insures the basic
benefits provided by defined benefit plans while there is no such insurance
coverage for defined contribution arrangements. See id. at 669.
I do not doubt that there can be differences between defined benefit and
new comparability plans although the differences strike me as less important
than they do Mr. Orszag and Professor Stein. For example, most small
professional employers are not covered by the PBGC, negating as to such
employers this difference between the defined benefit and the new
comparability motifs. More seriously, the differences cited by Mr. Orszag and
Professor Stein do not undermine the basic assertion that the allocations of
pension resources achieved by new comparability plans are equivalent to the
allocations achievable via defined benefit pensions.
19. Orszag & Stein, supra note 1, at 631 ("From our perspective, the
regulations are a beneficial, albeit limited, first step on the road to eliminating
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logic, are unpersuasive as a matter of horizontal equity.
There is no compelling reason to condemn allocations of
pension resources favoring older entrepreneurs and
professionals when achieved via cross-tested new
comparability devices as long as such allocations can be
attained through conventional defined benefit formulas.
Neither new comparability arrangements nor small
employer defined benefit plans produce the social
advantages (e.g., risk-shifting) which, for Mr. Orszag and
Professor Stein, are the raison d'etre of the putative tax
expenditure for qualified plans. Why, then, ban one but not
the other?
When Mr. Orszag and Professor Stein turn their
attention to the nondiscrimination norm, we have a
surprising degree of agreement. While that agreement is
"with some reluctance,"2 0 Mr. Orszag and Professor Stein
acknowledge that current nondiscrimination law "lack[s]
substance."' In light of that insubstantiality, I would
abolish the nondiscrimination norm. If that is not feasible,
my second choice is to replace the nondiscrimination norm
with the kind of minimum distribution and contribution
rules presently embodied in the top-heavy and 401(k) safe
harbor provisions."
My second choice is, with modifications,' Mr. Orszag
and Professor Stein's first choice. That difference, I contend,
reflects the most basic disagreement between Mr. Orszag
and Professor Stein, on the one hand, and me, on the other:
grounded in the tax expenditure perspective, they believe
that qualified plans can and should be regulated to force
most cross-testing."); id. at 665 ("We view the regulations as a significant first
step in limiting the use of cross-testing for defined contribution plans."); id. at
674 ("The Treasury Department's proposed regulations limiting the use of crosstesting are a useful first step in curtailing the most egregious cases in which the
basic intent of the nondiscrimination norm is violated.").
20. Id. at 671.
21. Id. at 669-70; see also id. at 670 ("[W]e doubt the efficacy of today's
nondiscrimination rules to produce meaningful retirement savings for rankand-file employees who participate in such plans."); id. at 671 ("[The current
regime does not reflect a meaningful proportionality requirement for most small
firms ... .
22. Zelinsky, supra note 2, at 626.
23. Mr. Orszag and Professor Stein would supplement the minimum
contribution mandate with enhanced salary reduction requirements and with a
strengthened version of the current regulatory requirement that plans be
permanent. See Orszag & Stein, supranote 1, at 669-74.
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additional retirement savings for rank-and-file employees.24
Hence their insistence that, if the nondiscrimination norm
goes, it be replaced by requirements for minimum
contributions and benefits as well as their determination to
ratchet further the regulation of small employer defined
benefit plans and cross-tested defined contribution
arrangements.
In contrast, I perceive that regulation in this area has
become counterproductive and unsuccessful. It is difficult to
identify the precise point at which the costs inflicted by the
continually tightened regulation of qualified plans first
started to outweigh the benefits of such additional
regulation. There is, however, no doubt that we are today
well past that point. The sad reality is that the qualified
plan regime will not generate significant retirement income
for much of the American workforce. Tinkering further with
that regime is, on balance, likely to do more harm than
good.
I do not purport to have an answer to the pressing
problem of providing retirement income for lower-paid
Americans. I suspect that there is no single answer to that
problem but, rather, some necessary combination of
changes to our culture, life-styles, work places and social
security system. But I am quite confident that more
regulation of the qualified plan system is not the answer to
the challenge of retirement savings for low-income
Americans.

24. See id. at 650 ("IMlost analysts and policy-makers agree that qualified
pension plans generate tax expenditures. As such, non-discrimination rules and
other forms of regulation are warranted.").

